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S
ocial protection involves policies and programs that protect 
people against risk and vulnerability, mitigate the impacts of 
shocks, and support people who suffer from chronic incapacities 
to secure basic livelihoods. It can also build assets, reducing both 
short-term and intergenerational transmission of poverty. It includes 
social insurance (such as health, life, and asset insurance, which may 
involve contributions from employers and/or beneficiaries); social 
assistance (mainly cash, food, vouchers, or subsidies); and services 
(such as maternal and child health and nutrition programs). Interven-
tions that provide training and credit for income-generating activities 
also have a social protection component.
Interest in social protection is growing across Africa, fueled by 
persistent high rates of poverty and malnutrition; the undermining of 
livelihoods and family-based support systems by shocks such as the 
AIDS epidemic; volatile food prices and the calamities of weather and 
war; extensive evidence that denying children basic nutrition, health, 
and education has lifelong, irreversible, and intergenerational 
consequences; and growing evidence of the effectiveness of social 
protection in low-income countries throughout the world—particularly 
in contributing to poverty reduction and improved health, nutrition, 
and education. Approaches vary across regions and countries, with a 
notable introduction or scale-up of cash transfers for the very poor in 
southern and East Africa. While many programs have been undertaken 
on a pilot basis, successful implementation of large-scale social 
protection programs in Ethiopia and South Africa—each with more 
than 8 million beneficiaries—has demonstrated that social protection 
systems are no longer only within the reach of rich countries.
What Can Social Protection Achieve?
Social protection has protective, preventative, promotional, and 
transformational functions. In the figure below, programs are loosely 
placed under the objectives with which they are normally associated; 
for example, a food or cash transfer is often used to secure basic 
consumption. However, each type of program can be used to achieve 
any of these four objectives. For example, a cash transfer can also 
build assets by: 1) keeping children from leaving or missing school 
because fees are too expensive or children’s labor is needed at home 
(for example, South Africa’s Child Support Grant increased school 
attendance by 25 percent); 2) taking the form of a wage in exchange 
for constructing social infrastructure (for example, South Africa’s 
public works programs have built water systems, clinics, and schools); 
and 3) enabling people to invest in a small business (for example, 
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme increased the likelihood 
of households operating nonfarm businesses). These programs can 
also transform relations between citizens and government when they 
work together in targeting, monitoring, or service delivery. There are 
trade-offs across goals, however. As the top of the figure shows, 
protective and preventative interventions tend to require less capacity 
of implementers and beneficiaries, fewer inputs, and can be scaled up 
more quickly. Promotional and transformational interventions are 
more complex, require greater capacities and resources, and are more 
challenging to scale up. Countries with high levels of poverty and low 
institutional and financial capacities can start with simpler, protective 
interventions such as cash or food transfers, prioritizing interventions 
appropriate for the most vulnerable groups. As capacities advance, 
more complex interventions can be added.
What Are the Concerns with Social Protection?
Three concerns are often expressed about social-protection interventions: 
(1) they might create work disincentives and reduce informal transfers;  
(2) they might compete with growth-promoting expenditures; and (3) they 
are unaffordable. Existing evidence, however, casts serious doubt on all three.
In terms of creating disincentives or reducing informal transfers, 
most studies find that public transfers have modest or no effect on work 
effort or private transfers. The main exception is for children, where 
studies of conditional cash transfers have found that the programs 
significantly reduce child labor, a desirable outcome. Evidence from South 
Africa suggests that receipt of social grants is associated with increased 
labor-force participation, possibly because cash makes job seeking easier.
Fairness and human rights will always be an important motivation 
for social protection, but social protection also has an instrumental 
function in promoting growth. This can occur through increasing poor 
people’s access to assets—by enabling them to purchase livestock, 
building productive infrastructure such as roads and irrigation, promot-
ing education and health, or reducing risk so that people can use assets 
more efficiently. Social protection can also contribute to growth 
through reducing inequality.
The concern that must be taken most seriously is that of afford-
ability in highly resource-constrained environments. This concern, 
however, overstates the costs of many well-targeted programs. 
International Labour Organization (ILO) projections for seven countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa suggest that a child benefit would cost between 
1.4 and 4.5 percent of GDP, and a universal old-age and disability pension 
between 0.3 and 0.6 percent of GDP. Such programs can be financed by 
reallocating expenditures that offer little tangible benefit for the poor, 
as well as by increasing efficiencies of social expenditures through 
capacity enhancements. In low-income countries in Africa, international 
aid can play a large role in initially financing social-protection interven-
tions, and in some countries, sustained aid may be needed and appropri-
ate. Over time, however, increased levels of domestic financing signal 
political commitment and facilitate sustainability.
Key Considerations in Designing Social Protection
Should Programs Be Universal or Targeted?
Should social protection be universal (provided to everyone) or targeted 
(restricted to certain groups)? Universal programs reduce the likelihood of 
excluding those who need them. But universal programs such as food 
subsidies are expensive, and a considerable share of their benefits tends to 
flow to people who do not need them. Evidence suggests that in terms of 
reaching the poor, targeted cash transfer programs tend to perform better 
than untargeted subsidies. But choosing to target requires deciding who 
should be targeted and how. Ways of doing this include 1) means testing, 
which has worked reasonably well in South Africa’s cash transfer 
programs; 2) selection by community-based committees, which has 
worked well on a pilot basis in Zambia and Malawi; 3) targeting categori-
cally by characteristics such as region or age—such as old-age pensions in 
South Africa that have been shown to improve children’s education 
(increasing attendance by 20–25 percent) and nutrition (increasing child 
height-for-age by approximately 1–5 centimeters); and 4) self targeting, 
where anyone can participate but the poorest tend to self-select, which 
has worked well in public works programs in many countries. The optimal 
method depends on the program objectives, administrative capacity, and 
social characteristics of communities.
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Implementing social protection requires that citizens are made aware of 
the program, beneficiaries are correctly identified, administrative and 
operational systems are put into place that deliver regular benefits and 
other inputs, and that there are effective monitoring-and-evaluation 
systems. This will be a challenge in environments where delivery 
capacity is weak. But it is not an insurmountable challenge—models 
exist of successful programs in very poor, low-capacity countries, such 
as Nicaragua. In such environments, it makes sense to start with simpler 
programs; build on community, nongovernmental, and governmental 
systems; put in place mechanisms that facilitate learning; and pay close 
attention to implementation issues.
How Can Direct Social Assistance Contribute to Building Assets?
In many countries, cash transfers are used to increase the education, 
health, and nutrition of children. This is achieved through making the cash 
(and sometimes food or nutritional supplements) conditional on households 
undertaking certain actions such as ensuring their children attend school or 
attend health check-ups, and having mothers attend health and nutrition 
education workshops (called “conditional cash transfers”). In Latin America, 
conditionality has been shown to improve school enrollment, increase the 
supply and quality of schools and health centers, and increase political 
support for cash transfers. Conditionality is administratively complex, 
however, and requires adequate quantity and quality of services. In Africa, 
where there is little experience with conditionality, and unconditional cash 
transfers have improved human capital outcomes, conditionality should be 
explored cautiously and flexibly. Experience suggests that conditional 
programs should not follow a blueprint; they work best when designed to 
respond to a specific problem, such as low secondary-school enrollment 
due to family financial constraints, despite an adequate supply of schools.
Another way to build assets is to link transfers to productive 
activities; health, nutrition, or education activities (including, for 
example, AIDS awareness and voluntary testing and counseling); or social 
services. For example, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme 
(PSNP) links beneficiaries receiving transfers to agricultural extension 
agents, development workers, and access to credit. Evaluations indicate 
that transfers plus access to these complementary activities have a 
much bigger effect on a range of outcomes (such as food security and 
use of improved seeds and fertilizers) than just transfers alone. For 
example, mean caloric availability among households receiving both 
PSNP transfers and these complementary activities was 10 percent 
higher than among comparable nonbeneficiaries. In Kenya’s Cash 
Transfer Program for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, transfers are 
being linked to lectures on child and maternal health, prevention and 
treatment of illness, and nutrition. Some programs in Latin America are 
experimenting with linking cash transfers to savings schemes.
How Long Should People Be Covered by an Intervention?
This depends on the program’s objective and target group. In cases 
where groups are targeted categorically, such as the elderly, disabled, or 
chronically ill, these grants will need to be ongoing. For children who are 
targeted because their family is poor, the simplest approach is to let them 
“age-out” of programs, which also completes a commitment to their 
education. Where programs have funding constraints, however, this can 
mean that households that may no longer need assistance remain in the 
program while those that need it more do not get a chance to enter. An 
alternative is to reassess household eligibility after a certain period of 
participation, though the frequency chosen involves trade-offs between 
costs, equity, and security. Where a country can afford it, a “life cycle” 
approach to social protection is best, where different interventions cover 
people based on their stage in the life cycle: for example, health and 
nutrition programs for children 0–2 years of age, health and early 
childhood development for children 3–5 years, education support for 
primary and secondary school-age children, livelihoods support for 
able-bodied adults, and pensions for the elderly and disabled. However, 
poor countries will have to start with more modest interventions until 
capacity and resources enable a more comprehensive system.
Conclusion
The widespread implementation of social protection programs across 
Africa can play a critical role in sustainably reducing poverty and hunger 
across the continent. The benefits of these interventions for strengthen-
ing access to nutrition, health, and education; reducing intergenera-
tional transmission of poverty; and promoting political stability, 
economic growth, and human dignity suggest that debates in Africa 
should turn from whether social protection is desirable and feasible to 
how best to design such programs to achieve development objectives.
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